

Da sociologia da ciência à epistemologia da expertise

Rachel Herdy

FND/UFRJ

Sumário da aula

1. O problema da demarcação
2. **As guerras da ciência**
3. **Da sociologia da ciência à epistemologia da expertise**

Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity

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Preview

Transgressing the Boundaries TOWARD A TRANSFORMATIVE HERMENEUTICS OF QUANTUM GRAVITY

Alan D. Sokal

Transgressing disciplinary boundaries . . . [is] a subversive undertaking since it is likely to violate the sanctuaries of accepted ways of perceiving. Among the most fortified boundaries have been those between the natural sciences and the humanities.

—Valerie Greenberg, *Transgressive Readings*

The struggle for the transformation of ideology into critical science . . . proceeds on the foundation that the critique of all presuppositions of science and ideology must be the only absolute principle of science.

—Stanley Aronowitz, *Science as Power*

There are many natural scientists, and especially physicists, who continue to reject the notion that the disciplines concerned with social and cultural criticism can have anything to contribute, except perhaps peripherally, to their research. Still less are they receptive to the idea that the very foundations of their worldview must be revised or rebuilt in the light of such criticism. Rather, they cling to the dogma imposed by the long post-Enlightenment hegemony over the Western intellectual outlook, which can be summarized briefly as follows: that there exists an external world, whose properties are independent of any individual human being and indeed of humanity as a whole; that these properties are encoded in “eternal” physical laws; and that human beings can obtain reliable, albeit imperfect and tentative, knowledge of these laws by hewing to the “objective” procedures and epistemological strictures prescribed by the (so-called) scientific method.

But deep conceptual shifts within twentieth-century science have undermined this Cartesian-Newtonian metaphysics (Heisenberg 1958; Bohr 1963); revisionist studies in the history and philosophy of science have cast further doubt on its credibility (Kuhn 1970; Feyerabend 1975; Latour 1987; Aronowitz 1988b; Bloor 1991); and, most recently, feminist and poststructuralist critiques have demystified the substantive content of

JOURNAL ARTICLE

Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity

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217-252 (36 pages)
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O caso Sokal

As guerras da ciência

National Geographic, 2015

- Mudanças climáticas não existem
- Evolução nunca aconteceu
- Aterrisagem na lua é fake
- Vacinações podem levar ao autismo
- Alimentos geneticamente modificados são do mal






Cuidado com a metáfora bélica

- A ideia de guerra deve ser aplicada com cautela
 - Perigo da caricatura
 - Pode impedir a comunicação, o diálogo
 - “Não olhe para cima”, Netflix, dezembro 2021
- Pode não refletir as verdadeiras causas da “hesitação”
 - Vacinas: existe uma crise de confiança na medicina e nas instituições científicas

2007



Seis Sinais de Cientificismo¹

Susan Haack

Tradução de Eli Vieira Araujo-Jnr²

RESUMO: Da forma como a palavra “cientificismo” é usada atualmente, é uma verdade trivial que o cientificismo – uma atitude inapropriadamente deferente para com a ciência – deveria ser evitado. Mas é uma questão substancial quando e por que a deferência às ciências é inapropriada ou exagerada. Este artigo tenta responder a essa pergunta ao articular os “seis sinais de cientificismo”: o uso honorífico de “ciência” e seus cognatos; o uso de adornos científicos de forma puramente decorativa; a preocupação com a demarcação; a preocupação com o “método científico”; a procura nas ciências por respostas além de seu escopo; negar a legitimidade ou o valor de investigações não científicas (p. ex. legal ou literária) ou da poesia e da arte.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: cientificismo, uso honorífico de “ciência”, demarcação da ciência, método científico, ciência e valores

THE GREAT ENDARKENMENT

PHILOSOPHY FOR AN AGE OF
HYPER-SPECIALIZATION



Híper-especialização

- No passado, não deveríamos abandonar a autonomia epistêmica (Kant)
 - “Pense por si mesmo”
 - Condição 1: você pode
 - Condição 2: você tem que fazer isso
- Hoje, precisamos deixar que outras pessoas pensem por nós (epistemólogos sociais)
 - Vivemos em nichos híper-especializados
 - Não temos mais o “cientista”, mas o “expert”
 - Autonomia não é uma opção! (*Outsourcing*)

EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE*

I find myself believing all sorts of things for which I do not possess evidence: that smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer, that my car keeps stalling because the carburetor needs to be rebuilt, that mass media threaten democracy, that slums cause emotional disorders, that my irregular heart beat is premature ventricular contraction, that students' grades are not correlated with success in the nonacademic world, that nuclear power plants are not safe (enough) . . . The list of things I believe, though I have no evidence for the truth of them, is, if not infinite, virtually endless. And I am finite. Though I can readily imagine what I would have to do to obtain the evidence that would support any one of my beliefs, I cannot imagine being able to do this for *all* of my beliefs. I believe too much; there is too much relevant evidence (much of it available only after extensive, specialized training); intellect is too small and life too short.



What are we as epistemologists to say about all these beliefs? If I, without the available evidence, nevertheless believe a proposition, are my belief and I in that belief necessarily irrational or nonrational? Is my belief then *mere* belief (Plato's right opinion)? If not, why not? Are there other good reasons for believing propositions, reasons which do not reduce to having evidence for the truth of those propositions? What would these reasons look like?

In this paper I want to consider the idea of intellectual authority, particularly that of experts. I want to explore the "logic" or epis-

*In a paper about epistemic dependence, it is fitting that I acknowledge my own debts. I have benefited by helpful comments and criticisms of earlier versions of this paper by William R. Carter, by members of the philosophy departments at the University of Tennessee and East Tennessee State University, and by Mary Read English. My dependence on William Bugg, Professor of Physics at the University of Tennessee, for discussion of a central example will become evident.

Epistemologia social

- Conceito de "dependência epistêmica"
- John Hardwig, "Epistemic Dependence", *Journal of Philosophy* 82(7), 1985
 - Nossas crenças dependem do testemunho
 - Cientistas dependem uns dos outros
 - "Divisão epistêmica do trabalho"
- Alguns autores:
 - Alvin Goldman
 - Jennifer Lackey
 - Sanford Goldberg
 - Elizabeth Fricker



Forthcoming in: Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Experts: What Are They and How Can Laypeople Identify Them?

Thomas Grundmann, University of Cologne

In complex modern societies, the production and social spread of knowledge both rely on the division of cognitive labor. Typically, the collaborators are not simply epistemic equals, such that anyone could do each of the diverse cognitive jobs, but instead differ strongly in their cognitive skills. Experts, in this respect, are top performers in their respective domains of expertise. They are particularly competent at specific cognitive tasks, owing these abilities to individual talent and rigorous training. Many experts are scientists. Moreover, experts typically occupy powerful and highly influential social roles. Given their high credibility, they serve as teachers or advisors of individual laypeople, public opinion and political deliberation.

From a philosophical point of view, a number of closely related questions must be addressed: (1) *What is an expert?*, (2) *How can laypeople identify the relevant experts?*, and (3) *How much weight should laypeople assign to expert testimony?* These questions are not

Epistemologia da expertise

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective

EXPLORING KNOWLEDGE AS A SOCIAL PHENOMENON

expert



ACADEMIC AGONIES

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COLLECTIVE VISION

COVID-19

CRITICAL APPRECIATION


CRITICAL REPLIES

ISSUES

SPECIAL ISSUES

WHO WE ARE

Search results for 'expert'



Coalitions of Trust: Using Epistemic Teams to Identify Experts, Jamie Carlin Watson

BY [SERRC, EDITOR](#) on [AUGUST 25, 2020](#) • [\(0 \)](#)


I appreciate the opportunity to continue this conversation on how non-experts might identify and, thereby, come to trust experts. While so much of contemporary philosophical discussion might be called destructive—attempts to defeat an “opponent’s” claims through counterexample—this forum has been... [Read More >](#)



'Epistemic Injustice' in Aid Sector and Agenda for Researching National Development Experts, Palash Kamruzzaman

BY [SERRC](#) on [JUNE 28, 2021](#) • [\(0 \)](#)

Susanne Koch, reflecting on her experience of working in the development aid sector, asserts that ‘experts from within the aid-receiving countries are subject to discriminatory credibility judgment based on their identity and that this seems to happen not incidentally but... [Read More >](#)



Can Novices be Taught to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Optimism for Reasoning—A Reply to Johnny Brennan, Martin Hinton

BY [SERRC](#) on [APRIL 27, 2020](#) • [\(1 \)](#)

In his article “Can Novices Trust Themselves to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Reasons for (Reserved) Optimism” (2020), Johnny Brennan does two things. He illustrates the problem of the identification of experts, which has caused a great deal of



Hunting the Expert: The Precarious Epistemic Position of a Novice, Jamie Carlin Watson

BY [SERRC](#) on [APRIL 21, 2020](#) • [\(0 \)](#)

In Lewis Carroll’s poem, “The Hunting of the Snark,” ten adventurers set out to find an elusive, likely dangerous, and possibly mythical, creature called a “Snark.” They plot their course with a map that shows only ocean—no land—and their captain... [Read More >](#)